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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Kirk Loftis appeals from the district court's denial of his Rule 35 motion,
contending his felony sentence is illegal because the charging document was
only sufficient to confer jurisdiction over a misdemeanor.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
On November 26, 2003, the state filed an Information charging Loftis with
"DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE PRESENCE OF CHILDREN, FELONY, I.C. §
18-903, 918(7)(b)." (#31003 R.1, p.21 (capitalization original).) The Information
further alleged:
That the Defendant, KIRK A. LOFTIS, on or about the 1st day
of October, 2003, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did actually,
intentionally and unlawfully commit a traumatic injury upon the
person of Kim Richards, to-wit: by punching the victim in the face
and head, pulling her by the hair and strangling her by the neck,
four (4) years
while in the presence of a child, to-wit:
old, and where Kim Richards and the Defendant are household
members.
(#31003 R., pp.21-22 (capitalization original).)
Loftis proceeded to trial and was found guilty of "domestic violence in the
presence of a child, as charged."

(#31003 R., p.53 (emphasis omitted).)

On

October 14, 2004, the court entered judgment and imposed a unified twenty-year
sentence with ten years fixed. (#31003 R., pp.79-81.) Loftis also filed a Rule 35
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The Idaho Supreme Court entered an Order Taking Judicial Notice "of the
Clerks' Record and Reporter's Transcript filed in prior appeal No. 31003, State v.
Loftis." (Order Taking Judicial Notice, dated May 2, 2012.) In his opening brief,
Loftis erroneously states that the Court took judicial notice of Docket No. 31102.
(Opening Brief of Appellant, p.1 n.1.)
1

motion requesting a reduction of his sentence, which the court denied. See State
v. Loftis, Docket No. 31003, 2007 Unpublished Opinion No. 349 at pp.1, 11-12
(Idaho App. Feb. 9, 2007). The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Loftis' conviction
and sentence. Loftis, supra.
On December 19, 2011, more than seven years after judgment was
entered, Loftis filed a second Rule 35 motion, and a supporting brief, claiming his
sentence is illegal. (R., pp.7-13.) In his supporting memorandum, Lofits argued:
Domestic VIOLENCE is not a crime upon which the defendant
could be legally sentenced (as opposed to Domestic BATTERY).
Domestic Violence is a statute designed to enhance an underlying
criminal act.
While the Defendant may have [legally] been
sentenced for the crime of BATTERY (§18-903), or arguably to
Domestic Battery (§18-918(3)(b)), Defendant was not charged nor
convicted of Domestic Battery, thus, the maximum term to which
this Court could legally sentence the defendant was (up to) six (6)
months subject to any enhancement pursuant to LC. §18-918(7)(b).
(R., pp.10-11

(emphasis, capitalization, and bracketed language original,

footnote omitted).)
The state filed a response to Loftis' motion, asserting (1) Loftis' "sentence
is within the statutory parameters and is not illegal," and (2) the motion is
"untimely" to the extent Loftis was complaining about the jury instructions. (R.,
pp.14-15.)
The district court denied Loftis' motion, stating:
On July 7, 2004, Mr. Loftis was convicted of Domestic
Violence in the Presence of a Child, Felony (I.C. §§ 18-908, 18918). The Court notes that the title of section 18-918, Idaho Code,
is "Domestic Violence." The Court subsequently sentenced Mr.
Loftis to ten (10) years' [sic] fixed incarceration followed by ten (10)
years' [sic] indeterminate. The maximum sentence for committing
Domestic Violence in the Presence of a Child is twenty (20) years.
I.C. § 18-918(2), (4). Thus, Mr. Loftis's twenty-year sentence is
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fixed within the limits of the statute, and the sentence does not
need to be corrected.
To the extent that Mr. Loftis challenging [sic] his conviction
on the basis that it was improperly titled, his argument is frivolous.
Section 18-918 is clearly titled "Domestic Violence." To the extent
that Mr. Loftis is challenging the constitutionality of his conviction,
his arguments are untimely.
(R., p.16.)
Loftis filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.18-20.)
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ISSUES
Loftis states the issues on appeal as follows:
1.

Did the court have subject-matter jurisdiction to impose
judgment for a felony?

2.

Was the twenty-year sentence imposed illegal due to lack of
jurisdiction when the charging document can only be
construed as charging a misdemeanor?

(Opening Brief of Appellant, p.5.)

The state rephrases the issue as follows:
Has Loftis failed to show error in the denial of his Rule 35 motion?

4

ARGUMENT
Loftis Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Rule 35 Motion
A.

Introduction
Loftis asserts he should have been granted Rule 35 relief because, he

argues, the sentence imposed upon his conviction for felony domestic violence
was illegal due to a lack of jurisdiction over a felony offense. (Opening Brief of
Appellant, pp.7-10.)

Loftis' claim fails because it is nothing more than an

untimely due process argument relabeled as a jurisdictional claim.

B.

Standard Of Review
Jurisdiction is a question of law over which this Court exercises free

review. State v. Kavaiecz, 139 Idaho 482,483, 80 P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003). The
legality of a sentence is also a question of law subject to free review. State v.
Morris, 131 Idaho 263,264, 954 P.2d 681,682 (Ct. App. 1998).

C.

The State's Charging Document Was Sufficient To Confer Jurisdiction
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to determine cases over a general

type or class of dispute." State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 840, 252 P.3d 1255,
1258 (2011) (quoting Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 142, 145, 158 P.3d 305, 308
(2007)).

"The information, indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was

committed within the State of Idaho confers subject matter jurisdiction upon the
court." Lute, 150 Idaho at 840, 252 P.3d at 1258 (quoting State v. Rogers, 140
Idaho 23, 28, 91 P.3d 1127, 1132 (2004)).

The Information filed in Loftis'

underlying criminal case satisfied the jurisdictional requirements in that it alleged

5

an offense committed in the State of Idaho. That Loftis believes it only alleged a
misdemeanor versus a felony does not present a jurisdictional question because
the court would still have jurisdiction even if, as Loftis contends, the charging
document only alleged a misdemeanor. Loftis' assertion that the Information was
only sufficient for purposes of charging a misdemeanor is more accurately
characterized as a due process argument, which is clearly untimely and not
within the purview of Rule 35. State v. Murray, 143 Idaho 532, 536, 148 P.3d
1278, 1282 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 760, 101 P.3d
699, 704 (2004)) ("pursuant to I.C.R. 12(b)(2), due process objections to a
charging document are waived unless raised before trial"); Housley v. State, 119
Idaho 885, 889, 811 P.2d 495, 499 (Ct. App. 1991) ("The Rule 35 motion serves
a narrower purpose. It subjects only the sentence to reexamination."). Because
Loftis' claim that his sentence is illegal is predicated on his erroneous assertion
that the court lacked jurisdiction, it also fails.
Even if this Court considers whether the language in the Information was
sufficient to charge a felony offense, Loftis has failed to establish it was not.
Loftis claims the Information was jurisdictionally defective for purposes of
charging a felony because it did not reference subsection (3) of I.C. § 18-918 and
did not include the word "willfully" as used in that subsection. (Opening Brief of
Appellant, pp.7-8.) To the contrary, despite these omissions, the only reasonable
construction of the Information is that it charged Loftis with felony domestic
violence in the presence of a child.

Although the Information does not cite

subsection (3) of I.C. § 18-918, it includes the "traumatic injury" language of I.C.
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§ 18-918(3) and expressly cites subsection (7)(b) of that same statute, which

pertains to the enhancement for committing domestic violence in the presence of
a child, and specifically alleges facts in support of the enhancement. Obviously
the state could not invoke subsection (7)(b) if it were not alleging an offense
prohibited by I.C. § 18-918(3). It cannot reasonably be said that the absence of a
reference to subsection (3) of I.C. § 18-918 resulted in the failure to charge Loftis
with a felony, and it certainly cannot be said that the failure to cite that specific
subsection deprived the court of jurisdiction.
Loftis' argument that the absence of the word "willfully" in the Information
deprived the court of jurisdiction also fails. The Court of Appeals addressed a
similar issue in State v. Sohm and concluded otherwise. 140 Idaho 458, 95 P.3d
76 (Ct. App. 2004). Loftis acknowledges the holding in Sohm but contends the
"reasoning in that case ... is unsound and should not be followed." (Opening
Brief of Appellant, p.9.)
Idaho jurisprudence requires respect for its own precedent. The rule of
stare decisis dictates that controlling precedent be followed "unless it is
manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless
overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy
continued injustice." State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002);
State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) (quoting
Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990));
see also State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680 (1992)
("[P]rior decisions of this Court should govern unless they are manifestly wrong
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or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise."); State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho
384, 388, 871 P.2d 801, 805 (1994) ("Having previously decided this question,
and being presented with no new basis upon which to consider the issue, [the
Court is] guided by the principle of stare decisis to adhere to the law as
expressed in [its] earlier opinions."); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 440-52, 825
P.2d 1081, 1096-1108 (1991) (McDevitt, J., specially concurring).
In Sohm, the defendant was charged as follows:
BUDDY SOHM is accused by this information of the crime
of: DOMESTIC BATTERY, Idaho Code§ 18-918(3), committed as
follows, to wit:
That the said BUDDY SOHM, in POCATELLO, in the County
of Bannock, State of Idaho, on or about the 11th DAY OF May,
2002, did inflict a traumatic injury upon another household member,
VICKI HEGG, by striking her in the face and body resulting in
traumatic injury.
Sohm, 140 Idaho at 459, 95 P.3d at 77 (capitalization original).
After he was found guilty, Sohm claimed the information failed to confer
jurisdiction on the district court because it "did not allege that he 'willfully' inflicted
the traumatic injury on his victim." Id. The Court reviewed the claim under the
following legal standard:
Where the alleged deficiency is not asserted until after the verdict,
the information will be liberally construed in favor of validity and will
be upheld unless it does not, by any fair or reasonable construction,
charge an offense for which the defendant is convicted. The
reviewing court has considerable leeway in construing the
information to imply the necessary allegations from the language of
the information.
Sohm, 140 Idaho at 459, 95 P.3d at 77 (quotations and citations omitted). Using
this standard the Court concluded "the language of the information alleging that

8

Sohm struck Hegg in the face and body resulting in traumatic injury, when
liberally construed adequately alleges the elements of the crime for which Sohm
was convicted" because the "information reasonably implies the 'willful' or
'intentional' element of I.C. § 18-918(3) by use of the word 'striking,' and by its
description of Hegg sustaining those strikes on her face and body."

Id.

(emphasis original). The Court reasoned that the word "strike," when considered
in context and

given

its "most commonly understood meaning," meant

"intentional rather than accidental."

~

at 459-60, 95 P.3d at 77-78.

The Court

further reasoned that the term "strike" was used to describe "repeated blows" as
evidenced by reference to the "face and body," which "underscores the
implication that an intent to cause traumatic injury informed Sohm's actions."
at 460, 95 P.3d at 78 (emphasis original).

~

"Thus," the Court held, "the

information was sufficient to charge Sohm with the crime of felony domestic
violence and to vest the district court with jurisdiction to try the case."

~

Loftis argues that "[t]he first problem with Sohm is that it found the use of
the word 'striking' in the charge raised 'the clear inference of repeated blows,"'
which he contends "is not the case," because "even a liberal reading of 'striking
her in the head and body' connotes two, not multiple, blows." (Opening Brief of
Appellant, p.9 (quoting Sohm, supra).) Loftis then argues the Court of Appeals
"compounds its error by concluding ... 'that an intent to cause traumatic injury
informed Sohm's actions'" because, he asserts, "a person could strike someone
repeatedly without having the specific intent to cause any injury, much less a
traumatic injury." (Id.)
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While Loftis quibbles with the Court's application of the legal standard to
the charging document at issue in Sohm, he does not appear to dispute the legal
standard itself, i.e., that the "information will be liberally construed in favor of
validity and will be upheld unless it does not, by any fair or reasonable
construction, charge an offense for which the defendant is convicted." As such,
he has failed to establish any basis for disregarding the standards set forth in
Sohm. Moreover, Loftis has failed to explain why the language "intentionally and
unlawfully commit a traumatic injury" used in the Information in his case does not
distinguish it from Sohm in a manner sufficient to resolve his concern that the
charging document in Sohm did not allege any intent.

(Opening Brief of

Appellant, p.9.)
If anything, the Court in this case need not follow Sohm because although
the Court in Sohm analyzed the adequacy of the language of the information for
purposes of determining whether it conferred jurisdiction, since Sohm the Court
has recognized that past precedents did not always recognize that there is a
"clear[ ] differentiat[ion] between due process and jurisdictional queries" and
specifically cited Sohm as one such example. Murray, 143 Idaho at 535, 148
P.3d at 1281. The Court in Murray noted the Supreme Court's opinion in Jones,
supra, which clarified the distinction and held "the liberal standard that applies to
an untimely jurisdictional challenge is satisfied if the charging document merely
cites the Idaho Code section under which the defendant is charged." l!;l at 536,
148 P.3d at 1282.

Thus, in Sohm, the jurisdictional issue could have been

resolved based on the fact that the information cited an Idaho Code section, just
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as the issue can be resolved in this case. Even if the Court concludes more is
required in this case in order to confer jurisdiction over a felony since the
Information does not cite I.C. § 18-918(3), for the reasons set forth above, the
language used in the Information was sufficient to do so.
Because the Information was adequate to confer jurisdiction in Loftis' case
(even accepting Loftis' felony-misdemeanor distinction), Loftis has failed to
demonstrate error in the denial of his Rule 35 motion.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's order
denying Lute's Rule 35 motion.
DATED this 2yth day of December 2012 .

•JESSICA M. LORELLO
Dep~ Attorney General
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DENNIS BENJAMIN
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JES~IPA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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